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Let me begin by thanking Dean Kearney and Professors Boyden and Murray for inviting me to give this lecture. It is a wonderful privilege to give a
lecture named after Judge Helen Nies, and I am particularly humbled to have
been asked to join the group of really eminent scholars and practitioners who
have given the Nies Lecture over the years.
My talk today is going to focus on the relationship between trademark and
unfair competition. As I was preparing the talk, I was delighted to learn about
Judge Nies’s career as a trademark practitioner. I had been quite familiar with
Judge Nies and her contributions to patent law, and obviously, she sat on a court
that also hears some significant trademark cases. But I learned from Graeme
Dinwoodie’s 2004 Nies lecture that for approximately twenty years prior to her
judicial service, Helen Nies was a prominent practitioner of trademark law and
even an Adviser to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which was
published in 1995, shortly before she passed away.1 So I am happy that my
topic today is a really appropriate fit with this lecture series.
As I alluded to before, I am going to discuss the way trademark law has
evolved over time with respect to property concepts. Let me try to give you a
sense of what I mean by that.

1. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial
Lecture on Intellectual Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 188 (2004).
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There has been a lot of discussion in the literature about the ways trademark
law has come to treat trademarks as property.2 Many scholars who have written
about this “propertization” have described it as a shift from consumer to producer protection.3 Once upon a time, the story goes, trademark law aimed to
protect consumers against confusion. It gave producers a cause of action
against others who used similar marks in ways that would confuse consumers—
but it did so only because the producers happened to be well situated and highly
motivated to vindicate consumer interests.4 A number of modern doctrines
(many of which allow claims based on much more attenuated forms of confusion or do not require evidence of confusion at all) reflect a problematic shift
away from those consumer interests and toward protection of producer property
interests.5
I have written a lot about this narrative over the course of my career—I
think it is overly simplistic, and in some ways, wrong. Trademark law has always protected marks as property and always significantly for the purpose of
protecting producers.6 What has changed is that modern law conceives of the
property interests much more broadly than it once did. So the important shift
in trademark law was not one from a system focused exclusively on consumer
interests to one focused on producers, or from no-property to property—it was
a shift in terms of the nature of the property interest protected.7
But even that revised narrative misses some important things about trademark law’s evolution because it is insufficiently attentive to significant changes
in the doctrinal structure of trademark law over the course of the last century—
specifically with respect to the relationship between trademark law and the
broader law of unfair competition. Changes in that relationship, I will argue,
did work a meaningful change in the “propertization” of trademark law. Relatedly, and necessarily, these same changes deemphasized legal rules that focused on the defendant’s conduct (rather than the plaintiff’s ownership interest).

2. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2120–21 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1693–94 (1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J.
367, 371–72 (1999); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1873–74 (2007) (discussing much of this literature).
3. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688; Lunney, supra note 2, at 371–72; McKenna, supra note
2, at 1846–47.
4. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1860–66.
5. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2, at 2121–22; Lemley, supra note 2, at 1688–89; Lunney, supra
note 2, at 371–72.
6. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1840–41.
7. Id. at 1884.
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I. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
To understand the shift I am describing, we need to begin with a bit of history.
The subject matter of trademark law was once defined in limited, ontological terms.8 As the court explained in Davis v. Davis, “A trade-mark is some
arbitrary or representative device attached to or sold with merchandise and
serving to designate the origin or manufacture of that merchandise.”9
On that definition, a trademark was a certain sort of thing—a word or device
(a logo or image) that unambiguously indicated the source of the goods with
which it was used. It unambiguously indicated the source because it was a word
(like EXXON) or a logo (like the Nike swoosh) that gave no information about
the nature of the products with which it was used, so there was no way to understand it except as a source indicator. To take a modern example: it makes
no sense to put the image of an apple on a computer—a computer is not made
of apples, does not taste like apples, does not come from a place called Apple,
etc. For that reason, the only sensible conclusion to draw about the image of
the apple on a computer is that it must be a brand.
In addition to being a certain sort of thing, a trademark also had to be used
in a certain sort of way—separate from,10 and affixed to, the goods whose origin
the mark indicated.11 Trademarks indicated the origin of goods; they were not
themselves the goods.

8. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1999).
9. Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 491–92 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
10. Id. at 492 (“I do not think that the merchandise itself, or any method of arranging the various
packages, can be registered as a trade-mark. In the very nature of the case, as it seems to me, the trademark must be something other than, and separate from, the merchandise.”); see also JAMES LOVE
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (2d ed. 1905)
(“It is obvious that if a commercial article itself could constitute a trademark, there would be little use
for patent laws. As Judge Carpenter said, ‘in the very nature of the case . . . the trademark must be
something other than, and separate from, the merchandise.’”).
11. See M’Andrew v. Bassett (1864) 46 Eng. Rep. 965, 968 (Ch.) (Eng.) (holding that marks
only become protectable once they are physically attached to goods and sold in the marketplace, not
merely when they acquire a reputation or fame); see also Kathreiner’s Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit
Beschraenkter Haftung v. Pastor Kneipp Med. Co., 82 F. 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1897) (adopting the affixation rule of M’Andrew). The Trademark Act of 1881 required that trademark applications contain “a
statement of the mode in which the same is applied and affixed to goods.” Trademark Act of 1881,
ch. 138, § 1, 21 Stat. 502, 503, superseded by Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (1905), repealed
by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The 1905 Act contained an identical provision. See Trademark Act of 1905, ch.
592, 33 Stat. 724, 724, repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Only indicators that met those conditions were considered trademarks; only
trademarks defined as such and used in interstate commerce were eligible for
federal registration;12 and only federally-registered marks could be enforced
under federal statutory law.13 Several types of indicators that modern law treats
as trademarks under some circumstances (things like surnames, descriptive
terms, geographic terms, and product packaging) were not considered trademarks under this more restrictive definition because the meaning of those things
was facially ambiguous.14 Those indicators could be used to indicate the source
of goods, but they also could be used to communicate characteristics of the
goods or other information about their origin. MILWAUKEE’S BEST, for example, might refer to a particular brand of beer, or it might just describe (in
laudatory fashion) a company’s beer as being the best in Milwaukee.15 Because
terms like these were facially ambiguous, they were not amenable to exclusive
ownership and were therefore not considered trademarks.
But the fact that trademark subject matter was narrowly defined did not
mean that the law offered no protection against misuse of other sorts of indicators. Parties that did not own trademarks (or “technical trademarks” as they
would come to be known)16 could still bring common law unfair competition
claims against those who, by means other than use of a trademark, attempted to
pass off their goods as though they were the plaintiff’s.17
Because those unfair competition cases involved use of matter that had
plausibly legitimate explanations, courts could not simply presume the
12. There was one exception Section 5 of the Trademark Act of 1905 provided that
nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of any mark used by the applicant or his predecessors
. . . in commerce with foreign nations or among the several states, or with Indian tribes, which
was in actual and exclusive use as a trademark of the applicant or his predecessors from whom
he derived title for ten years next preceding the passage of this act.
Trademark Act of 1905 § 5.
Despite that section’s reference to registration of a “trademark,” implying that only terms that qualified
as trademarks were eligible, the Supreme Court interpreted § 5 to allow for registration of marks that
were not technical trademarks. Because, technical trademarks were registrable once used in commerce
even without ten years of exclusive use, the Court believed that § 5 would have no effect if it merely
allowed for registration of technical trademarks with longer use. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233
U.S. 461, 465–66 (1914). Despite the statutory terminology, registration under § 5 did not make the
registered mark into a technical trademark, but it did allow the owner of the registration to enforce its
rights under federal law. Id.
13. See Trademark Act of 1905 § 16 (creating cause of action for infringement of registered
marks); see also id. § 17 (granting federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving use of a registered
mark in interstate commerce).
14. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1862; Dinwoodie, supra note 8, at 614.
15. My college experience tells me that would have been false advertising. But I digress.
16. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 4:3 (5th ed. 2019); see also McKenna, supra note 2, at 1862.
17. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1862.
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defendant’s conduct was illegitimate. As a result, courts typically required unfair competition claimants to prove that the defendant intended to pass off its
goods as those of the plaintiff, or at least that passing off was the likely consequence of the defendant’s conduct.18 To make that showing, an unfair competition plaintiff necessarily had to prove that the defendant made some explicit
misrepresentation or used some word or feature that consumers would associate
with the plaintiff. Trademark claimants were not required to prove any of those
things—source indication and intent to pass off were presumed.19
Prevailing plaintiffs in unfair competition cases also got more limited remedies—remedies sufficient to prevent the passing off, but short of a prohibition
on use of the term/feature.20 As the court said in G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, when an unfair competition plaintiff proves secondary meaning, there is
a “conflict of right.”21
The alleged trespassing defendant has the right to use the word, because
in its primary sense or original sense the word is descriptive; but,

18. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS 161 (1925). Some courts, particularly as the twentieth century progressed, did not
require unfair competition plaintiffs to prove intent, only that the defendant’s conduct was likely to
result in passing off. See, e.g., Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901)
(holding that, where an injunction is issued to prevent unfair competition, the evidence must disclose
“wrongful intent in fact, or justify that inference from the inevitable consequences of the act complained of”); Coty, Inc. v. Parfums de Grand-Luxe, Inc., 298 F. 865, 869–70 (2d Cir. 1924) (“[W]hile
there has been some difference of opinion, it is thought to be the better view that, where the necessary
and probably tendency of defendant’s conduct is to deceive the public and pass of his goods as and for
those of the plaintiff, especially where preventative relief only is sought, actual fraudulent intent need
not be shown.”).
19. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, 136 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1943)
(“In cases involving technical trademarks, the fraudulent intent to deceive is presumed, while in cases
of unfair competition complainant must prove this intent or show facts and circumstances from which
it may reasonably be inferred.”); Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 F. 623, 627 (1st Cir. 1915) (“In
the case of infringement of a technical trade-mark the intention of the infringer is immaterial, as the
essence of the wrong lies in the injury to a property right; while in the case of unfair competition the
intention is material, to establish fraud on the part of the defendant in the use of the imitative device to
beguile the public into buying his goods as those of his rival.”); see also McKenna, supra note 2, at
1862.
20. See, e.g., DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1936)
(holding “cellophane” generic for cellulose wrapping but requiring defendant to identify itself as the
source of goods to avoid confusion with plaintiff); Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir.
1924) (“[T]he utmost that the courts can do for the relief of the first user [in a case of unfair competition] is to enjoin not the use of the trade-mark but the unfair method of its use.”); Saalfield, 198 F. at
373–76 (allowing defendant to use the generic term “Webster’s dictionary” so long as it explained that
it was not the plaintiff); L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 197 F. 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1912) (allowing defendant to continue to use the surname “Waterman” but requiring a label that disclaimed
connection with the plaintiff).
21. Saalfield, 198 F. at 373.
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owing to the fact that the word has come to mean, to a part of the public,
something else, it follows that when the defendant approaches that
same part of the public with the bare word, and with nothing else, applied to his goods, he deceives that part of the public, and hence he is
required to accompany his use of the bare word with sufficient distinguishing marks normally to prevent the otherwise normally resulting
fraud.22
Following this logic, courts would not have prevented other beer producers
in Milwaukee from identifying their beer as being from Milwaukee or from
claiming their beer was the “best.” They would, however, have prevented those
other producers from presenting that information in a way that suggested their
beer was the same MILWAUKEE’S BEST that was sold by the company that
had long been selling beer under the name MILWAUKEE’S BEST.
To summarize: in this legal world that once existed, trademark and unfair
competition were conceptually integrated but doctrinally distinct bodies of
law.23 They were conceptually integrated in that all of unfair competition law
aimed to prevent passing off.24 Imitation of another’s trademark was just a
special case of unfair competition because, as prominent nineteenth-century
treatise writer James Love Hopkins said, use of another’s mark “is the easiest
method of stealing [someone’s] trade, and most universal because of the general use of marks or brands upon personal property.”25 It was in this sense that
trademark law has always been regarded as part of the “broader law of unfair
competition.”26
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Am. Prods. Co. v. Am. Prods. Co., 42 F.2d 488, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (“[T]his
case involves a trade-name, not a trade-mark, and therefore is governed by the law of unfair competition, not that of trade-marks . . . .”); see also McKenna, supra note 2, at 1860–63.
24. I focus here on trademark-adjacent unfair competition claims. Courts did recognize
other types of unfair competition claims that did not involve source indication. Though those other
claims are not my focus here, they did generally fit the broad pattern: they involved deceptive conduct that had the effect of diverting customers who otherwise would have gone to the claimant.
Product disparagement and trade libel, for example, were recognized because they entailed false
claims about a competitor or its products for the purpose of diverting that competitor’s customers to
oneself. See, e.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930) (affirming monetary damages awarded for unfair competition as a result of defendant’s “defamatory propaganda”
about plaintiff and its washing machines).
25. HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 1, at 2; see also McKenna, supra note 2, at 1860–63.
26. “The entire substantive law of trade-marks . . . is a branch of the broader law of unfair competition. The ultimate offense always is that defendant has passed off his goods as and for those of the
complainant.” Saalfield, 198 F. at 372; see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
428 (2003) (“Traditional trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition . . . that has its sources in English common law . . . .”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240
U.S. 403, 412–13 (1916) (“The essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one
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Trademark and unfair competition were doctrinally distinct in that trademark law dealt with misuse of the subset of indicators that qualified as trademarks under the prevailing, limited definition, while unfair competition was a
residual doctrine that dealt with attempts to pass off by other means.27 These
claims were meaningfully different in that unfair competition claimants faced
more onerous proof requirements and their remedies were more limited.
II. EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
The legal structure I have just described largely held through the middle of
the twentieth century. But then things began to change pretty fundamentally in
terms of the relationship between trademark and unfair competition.
First, courts began interpreting the Lanham Act (the federal trademark statute passed in 1946) to provide a cause of action for infringement of unregistered
trademarks.28 To most trademark lawyers trained in the last few decades, that
sounds unremarkable—we have long accepted that unregistered trademarks are
enforceable under § 43(a) on essentially the same terms as registered marks.29
But it is worth highlighting just how radically courts were changing trademark
law when they started recognizing those claims in the 1950s.30
Every federal trademark statute prior to the Lanham Act made registration
available only to indicators that qualified as trademarks under the much more
limited definition,31 and the cause of action created by those statutes was available only to federally-registered trademarks.32 Those limitations were not arbitrary—they reflected the deep structure of trademark and unfair competition
law, and the drafters of the Lanham Act did not believe they were changing that
practice.33
manufacturer or vendor for those of another. . . . This essential element is the same in trademark cases
as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trademark infringement. In fact, the common
law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”).
27. McKenna, supra note 2, at 1863.
28. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 27:12.
29. See id. § 27:14; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“[T]he
general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).”).
30. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46 (1996) (noting that “section 43(a) has undergone an amazing transformation at the hands of the federal judiciary”).
31. Again, subject to the one exception in § 5 of the Trademark Act of 1905, at least as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See supra note 12.
32. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW 288, 290–91 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
33. McCarthy, supra note 30, at 46–48 (reviewing the legislative history of section 43(a) and
concluding “[t]here was no indication that the drafters thought that section 43(a) could or would become the basis for a federal claim of infringement of unregistered marks or trade dress”).
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But the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins34 left many
trademark proponents and several courts concerned about disuniformity in the
law of unfair competition. Unfair competition had always been conceived of
as general law; after Erie, courts were forced to conclude it was state law, and
that raised the prospect of fifty different versions of unfair competition law. 35
Because that seemed unworkable, particularly as companies were increasingly
selling to national markets, courts began to interpret § 43(a) to give a cause of
action for infringement of unregistered marks. That is, they federalized a significant part of unfair competition as the solution to potential disuniformity.36
There was, however, an important terminological change here. Courts that
allowed claims under § 43(a) were not recognizing a federal unfair competition
cause of action; they were providing a cause of action for enforcement of unregistered trademarks.37 That bears emphasis because most unfair competition
cases explicitly did not involve unregistered trademarks. The indicators involved in those cases were not registered because they were not trademarks.38
But over time, that nuance was lost; courts largely conflated unfair competition
and trademark law.
Look no further than the Abercrombie spectrum. As anyone who has taken
a trademark course knows—Abercrombie is the most black-letter of all the
black-letter trademark law.39 In fact, if you were going to teach only one case
in the entire course, it would almost certainly be Abercrombie.
What Abercrombie teaches is that the way we determine whether a claimed
indicator is a trademark is by placing it in a category along the “spectrum” (generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful).40 The placement of a term
determines whether it qualifies as a trademark automatically, whether the term

34. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. That worry, as it turns out, was never justified—there was never a real risk of disuniformity.
See McKenna, supra note 32, at 298–300.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Court interprets this section [§ 43(a)] as having created a federal cause of action
for infringement of unregistered trademark or trade dress and concludes that such a mark or trade dress
should receive essentially the same protection as those that are registered.”).
38. See supra notes 8–11, 13–14, 16, and accompanying text. I am speaking generally here.
There were, of course, some indicators that qualified as trademarks and therefore could have been
federally registered but simply were not—either because they were not used in interstate commerce,
or because the owner never bothered to register. But typically, state cases enforcing those marks regarded the actions as trademark infringement, just not federal trademark infringement.
39. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976); Two Pesos,
Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (approving of the Abercrombie spectrum as the “classic formulation” of distinctiveness).
40. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 11:2.
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qualifies only with additional evidence (secondary meaning), or whether it is
disqualified.41
What’s notable for our purposes here is that the Abercrombie spectrum
serves as a way to determine whether a term is treated as a trademark or gets
no protection.42 And the spectrum is a mashup of trademark and unfair competition concepts. Indicators now placed in categories at the top end of the
spectrum are those that we once simply would have called trademarks. We now
call those terms “inherently distinctive,” and they are automatically protectable
simply by virtue of the classification.43 Other categories, however, consist of
indicators that were, by definition, not trademarks, such as descriptive words.44
Those terms—like MILWAUKEE’S BEST—now potentially qualify as trademarks. We just ask their proponents for proof that the terms actually do indicate
source and, if the proponents can make that showing, we pretend they are the
same as old-time technical trademarks. Conditions for relief in the face of not
owning a trademark have been transformed into requirements for proving trademark status.
This transformation has been so complete that the Supreme Court’s accepted in Two Pesos45 (a case about the design of a Mexican restaurant) and
Qualitex46 (a case about the color of a dry-cleaning press pad) that trademark
subject matter is now defined entirely functionally: it consists of “anything at
all that is capable of carrying [source-related] meaning.”47
And when anything can be a trademark, there is no real need for a residual
doctrine that provides relief for use of things that are not trademarks. If something does not qualify as a trademark, there is a reason—and the reason has to
do with its lack of capacity to identify source, not its ontological status as color,
shape, fragrance, word, or sign.
III. CONSEQUENCES
The consequences of assimilating unfair competition into trademark law
were largely unconsidered, and they continue to surface in some of the most
challenging modern cases. Here I want to highlight the way these changes have

41.
42.
‘mark’”).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. (noting that “[i]f a designation is not ‘distinctive,’ [under Abercrombie] it is not a
Id.
Id.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
Qualitex Co., v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
Id. at 162.
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increased emphasis on property concepts and decreased emphasis on equity—
or, if you like, on tort concepts.
In the former system I have described, the major cut between trademark and
unfair competition was whether the plaintiff had a valid (technical) trademark.
Trademark law property was therefore primarily concerned with questions of
validity (whether the plaintiff had a property interest in a trademark).48
Because the only indicators that unambiguously indicated source qualified
as trademarks, trademark cases necessarily involved indicators that competitors
had no legitimate explanation for using. And trademark owners could only
assert claims against direct competitors.49 As a result, once the plaintiff established ownership of a valid mark (which registration established as a prima facie matter), the only thing left to determine was whether the defendant was
using the same or a sufficiently-similar mark.50 Complicated infringement doctrines were unnecessary.
Unfair competition was at the opposite end of the spectrum. Those cases
by definition did not involve a property interest, so in determining whether any
remedy should be given, courts were not concerned with identifying the thing
the plaintiff owned.51 They were instead focused on the defendant’s conduct.
Specifically, courts in unfair competition asked whether, despite the plaintiff’s
lack of a property interest in a trademark, it should nevertheless get relief because the defendant was behaving badly in trying to steal the plaintiff’s customers.52 The doctrine was thick in equitable considerations; the plaintiff had
to prove intent to pass off, or at least the defendant’s conduct was calculated to
have that effect.53
Because modern law has eviscerated trademark law’s subject-matter limitations and accepted that anything capable of identifying source can be a

48. See, e.g., Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366, 375 (4th Cir. 1904); (“There are certain elements of
property right in a technical trade-mark . . . .”); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 279 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1900) (“It is commonly said that there is a right of property in a technical trade-mark, and an
infringement of it is spoken of as a violation of a property right.”).
49. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1890.
50. See, e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877) (“Difficulty frequently arises in
determining the question of infringement [of a technical trademark] . . . . Colorable imitation, which
requires careful inspection to distinguish the spurious trade-mark from the genuine, is sufficient to
maintain the issue . . . .”).
51. See, e.g., Wm. A. Rogers, Ltd. v. Int’l. Silver Co., 30 App. D.C. 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1907)
(“As an ordinary surname cannot be appropriated as a trademark, to the exclusion of others of the same
name, it follows that the rules of law relating to the similarity of technical trademarks cannot be applied
to the use of such surname as a mark, notwithstanding the confusion that may result from its legitimate
use by such others.”).
52. Supra notes 19, 21, and accompanying text.
53. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1867 n.122 (collecting cases).
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trademark, it has transformed cases that once would have been entirely about
the defendant’s conduct into cases that are largely—perhaps even overwhelmingly—about ownership. It has, to put it differently, shifted the balance of
property and equity substantially in the direction of property. That has had a
number of negative consequences.
A. Claiming
For one thing, it has put tremendous pressure on identification of the features of the claimed mark. Many cases that once focused entirely on the defendant’s conduct and the risk of passing off have been pushed into a property
framework—and that means the emphasis in those cases is necessarily on determining what, if anything, the plaintiff owns.
That is a complicated undertaking because the sorts of indicators that have
been reclassified as trademark subject matter have potentially ambiguous and
multiple meanings, and they often are complex or compound “indicators” that
include components that are not, on their own, protectable.54
It is therefore critical to understand what exactly is being claimed by the
plaintiff in order to evaluate validity. Courts cannot, for example, evaluate secondary meaning or functionality without knowing which features are claimed
as the mark, because conclusions on those issues might well be different depending on which features are included or excluded.55 Nor can courts effectively manage the scope of any rights in the mark—the range of other uses that
will be considered infringing—without defining its features.56
These challenges are primarily the result of expanding trademark subject
matter to accommodate indicators that once would not have been trademarks.
Claiming played a much lesser role in unfair competition, at least as it was once
configured. Because the emphasis in those cases was on the defendant’s conduct rather that the property owned by the plaintiff, there was no need to delineate precisely the boundaries of the trademark at issue.57 There was no trademark at issue.
To be sure, an unfair competition plaintiff had to prove that the defendant
intended to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff, or at least that deception
of that sort was likely, and doing so required articulation of the means by which

54. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2251–
52 (2016).
55. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 157
(2018).
56. Id.; see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 54, at 2243–59.
57. Supra notes 19, 21, and accompanying text.
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the defendant was to accomplish that goal.58 So it is not that the unfair competition cases made no mention of the features that would influence consumers.
But unfair competition focused only on passing off rather than broader notions of confusion, and for that reason, the only question courts were asking in
those cases was whether consumers were likely to buy the defendant’s product
believing that it was the plaintiff’s.59 They were not asking whether consumers
might think the parties were related, or whether the plaintiff sponsored the defendant, etc. That liability standard required a level of similarity that made
deconstruction of the indicators at issue unnecessary in most cases.
Probably even more importantly, unfair competition generally denied categorical relief (meaning parties could not get injunctions against use of the descriptive word or geographic term or design features as such).60 For that reason,
the precise identity of a claimed indicator was irrelevant.
B. The Validity/Infringement Divide
Conflation of trademark and unfair competition law has also led courts to
separate trademark cases into fairly formal validity and infringement phases.61
That is, of course, a doctrinal divide that did not meaningfully exist in the former regime. Trademark infringement cases were heavily (indeed, nearly exclusively) focused on whether the claimed indicator was a trademark (infringement being fairly straightforward once that was determined). Unfair
competition cases, by contrast, had no “validity” phase and were entirely about
liability.62
Separating “validity” and “infringement” doctrines has made litigation considerably more complex and costlier.63 For one thing, it has exacerbated courts’
difficulty in managing the scope of rights because it encourages claimants to
treat their rights “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any

58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F.2d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 1940) (“If the
simulation of the competitor in the dress of his goods is sufficient to deceive the average purchaser,
unfair competition exists . . . .”).
60. Supra note 20 and accompanying text.
61. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 23:1 (noting that “the plaintiff has the burden to
plead and prove both validity and infringement” and that it is necessary to keep the issues of validity
and infringement separate).
62. Supra notes 19, 21, and accompanying text.
63. See Glynn S. Lunney, Two-Tiered Trademark, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2018) (arguing that
modern trademark law’s complexity has made it too costly for defendants even when they have legitimate bases for using the asserted marks and also for many mark owners with potentially legitimate
infringement claims).
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direction,” depending on the issue.64 Plaintiffs describe their marks narrowly
for purposes of validity so as to differentiate them from features used by others
and to avoid functionality objections. But then they ignore those limitations for
purposes of infringement. Defendants, quite naturally, do the opposite. Courts
often have difficulty managing these variations because they lack a doctrinal
structure by which to identify the claimed mark for all purposes in the litigation.
At the same time, courts’ overly rigid distinction between validity and infringement doctrines has caused them to struggle with certain kinds of arguments—even though they are persuasive and connected to trademark policies—
because those arguments do not seem to arise in the “right” place in the case.
Take, for example, certain invocations of functionality doctrine. Manufacturers have in recent years taken to registering the designs of various auto parts
as trademarks (things like the front grilles). Sometimes they register, the shapes
of these parts with emblem or logo designs incorporated into them, but often
they simply claim the designs themselves or with the space for the logo shown
in dotted lines.65 And Customs has begun seizing shipments of replacement
auto parts that resemble the registered designs but are made by companies other
than the mark owners or their licensees.66
This is a new development. There has been a robust market for aftermarket
auto parts for many years—a market that has, until recently, been regarded as
entirely legitimate.67 Owners want to repair their damaged vehicles, and they
want to repair them in a way that restores their original design to the greatest
extent possible. They do not want to put a grille on their Jeep that does not
match the original. And aftermarket parts companies have, for a considerable
time, supplied parts that allow the owners to restore their vehicles in just that
way—and at lower cost than if the owners had to purchase the parts from the
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).68
In fact, many insurance companies will only pay (or at least will only pay
in full) for aftermarket parts.69 And in a number of states, those insurance companies are legally obligated to use parts of like kind and quality to the OEM

64. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886). On courts’ difficulty managing scope because of
the structure of doctrinal inquiry, see Lemley & McKenna, supra note 54.
65. See Susan Frohling, OEM Trademarks in the AfterMarket: Exploring the Boundaries,
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/19/oem-trademarks-aftermarket-exploring-boundaries/id=101163/ [https://perma.cc/F82N-6UB6].
66. See Mark P. McKenna, Criminal Trademark Enforcement and the Problem of Inevitable
Creep, 51 AKRON L. REV. 989, 1015 (2017).
67. See Frohling, supra note 65.
68. See McKenna, supra note 66, at 1015; Frohling, supra note 65.
69. See McKenna, supra note 66, at 1015.
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parts—which they obviously cannot do if the aftermarket parts look different
from those sold by the OEMs.70
Given these market dynamics, one might think the aftermarket parts companies would have powerful functionality arguments in these contexts. According to the Supreme Court, features are functional—and therefore cannot
serve as trademarks—when they are “essential to the use or purpose of the device” with which they are used, or the features “affect[] the cost or quality of
the device.”71 The designs of these replacement parts could hardly be more
“essential to the use or purpose” of the parts, and they clearly affect the “cost
or quality” of the parts.
The features seem functional even if we consider competitive need—which
we are supposed to do only in a subset of functionality cases.72 Exclusive use
of the designs of auto parts would give the OEMs a significant—indeed, decisive—competitive advantage (because no one would be able to compete with
them for replacement parts).
As a result, no matter how one approaches the question, all signs point to
functionality in this context, and therefore the legitimacy of the aftermarket
parts. But when these seizures have been challenged, Customs has rejected the
functionality arguments.73 Why? Because courts understand functionality to
be exclusively a question of validity.74 And when those parts are incorporated
into a new vehicle, courts think the designs seem to indicate source, and they
do not seem to be essential to the use or purpose of the car or to affect competition among car manufacturers. Other companies can and do make grilles with
different designs, and there does not seem to be a lack of competition among
sellers of cars.

70. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 11, § 216.7(b)(5) (2016) (“Standards for
prompt, fair and equitable settlement of motor vehicle physical damage claims.”).
71. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).
72. See id. (“It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ in
cases of esthetic functionality . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., Referral of Petition at 9, LKQ Corp./Keystone Auto. Indus., FP&F Case No. 20171703-000073-01, 2017-1703-000074-01, and 2017-1703-000091-01 (Oct. 31, 2017).
74. “The fact that the marks make defendants’ [product] more functional is irrelevant . . . .
Because we are not dealing with defendants’ wish to trademark their [product], but with [the owner’s]
ability to protect the trademarks it already uses to identify its products, the doctrine of functional use
does not help defendants here.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1031 (9th Cir. 2004). Many courts have echoed that same principle. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 162 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Once it is determined that the product feature—the
word mark ROSETTA STONE in this case—is not functional, then the functionality doctrine has no
application, and it is irrelevant whether [Defendant] Google’s computer program functions better by
use of Rosetta Stone’s nonfunctional mark.”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 7:63 (“If a
feature is found to be ‘functional,’ then it cannot be a valid trademark or trade dress: the issue of
validity is decided . . . .”).
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The argument about the functionality of the designs of auto parts is contextspecific—it is an argument that those designs have a function when they are
used for replacement parts, not that the designs cannot serve as trademarks under any circumstances. And courts do not recognize context-specific arguments
as being validity arguments. Because the argument does not fit the validity
pattern courts expect, they do not know how to deal with it.
C. “Defenses”
Something very similar could be said about the role of “defenses” in modern trademark law. Many scholars, myself included, have lamented the fact
that a number of the doctrines we call “defenses” in trademark law do not work
like real affirmative defenses.75 Because many of the doctrines I am talking
about (things like descriptive fair use) insulate particular uses from liability
only so long as those do not cause confusion, the doctrines are not conceptually
distinct from the prima facie case of infringement (which always requires proof
of likelihood of confusion).76 In that way, these doctrines differ from true defenses like self-defense in tort law—which does not deny elements of the prima
facie case but seeks to justify the otherwise tortious conduct. Trademark defenses are not clearly “yes, but” defenses—they are “not really, and maybe it is
not so bad” responses.
The fact that trademark “defenses” are bound up with the confusion question means that it is sometimes hard for defendants to get a court to dismiss a
case against them without having to engage the multi-factor likelihood-of-confusion test.77
Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that many of these defensive
doctrines are really just awkward restatements of unfair competition concepts
that are now being used in another context. In the descriptive fair use context
specifically, the kinds of terms at issue are ones that we would not previously

75. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 99, 100–01 (2009); Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark
Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 914–24 (2009); William McGeveran
& Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 277 (2013); Mark P.
McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 803–04 (2009).
76. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the degree of consumer confusion is a factor in evaluating fair use); see
also Robert G. Bone, Notice Failure and Defenses in Trademark Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1245, 1269–
70 (2016); McKenna, supra note 75, at 804–05.
77. See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to adopt the Sixth
Circuit’s fair use standard because it “would lead to the dismissal of these claims without addressing . . . whether consumers were actually confused by the allegedly infringing product”); see also
McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 75, at 255.
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have considered trademarks at all.78 In the regime we once had, courts’ consideration of the nature of the defendant’s use and possible confusion arose in
those cases entirely in the context of evaluation of the defendant’s conduct
where the question was not “confusion” but passing off, and where the remedy
would in any event never have been an injunction against mere use of the descriptive term itself.79
We have attempted to bolt onto a trademark system that treats even descriptive terms as trademarks (as property) equitable considerations from a bygone
era. Unsurprisingly, it is not a great fit.
D. Remedies
Finally, the collapse of unfair competition has had a considerable effect on
remedies. One of the reasons courts used to categorize certain words and devices as “trademarks” (or “technical trademarks”) was that those indicators
were the kinds of things that unambiguously identified source and were therefore amenable to exclusive rights.80 The remedies in trademark infringement
cases followed from that—because trademarks unambiguously indicated
source, there was no legitimate explanation for others to use them for the same
goods, and any such uses were enjoined.81
But the kinds of indicators that were dealt with in unfair competition were
not amenable to exclusive rights because there were potentially legitimate explanations for others’ uses. And the remedies in unfair competition reflected
that too—courts would not categorically enjoin use of those indicators (they
were not the property of the plaintiff), but they would force changes in the behavior of the defendant in order to prevent passing off. Remedies might include
changes in labeling or packaging or use of particular formats or language.82
The collapse of unfair competition into trademark has largely cost us that
remedial flexibility. Courts have put all of these cases on a property footing,
so once they have found infringement, they have concluded that the defendant
has taken something the plaintiff owns. As a result, cases are now much more

78. See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28,
31 (2d Cir. 1997) (descriptive term “Sealed With A Kiss” for lip gloss); Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) (product configuration of tree-shaped air fresheners); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995) (descriptive
term “Sweet-Tart” for candy).
79. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
80. Supra notes 8–11, 13, and accompanying text.
81. Supra notes 19, 21, 22, and accompanying text.
82. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.

1_21_20 MCKENNA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

1/28/20 2:46 PM

PROPERTY AND EQUITY IN TRADEMARK LAW

133

often all-or-nothing—the plaintiff seeks, and courts grant, injunctions against
the use of the claimed features.83
In recent years, some courts have started to feel a little uneasy about this,
and they have pushed back on what had become a rule that proving likelihood
of confusion meant the plaintiff had demonstrated irreparable harm and was
entitled to an injunction.84 And sometimes they have denied injunctions even
when likely confusion has been shown.85 But that still is all-or-nothing (in this
case, in the direction of nothing). What we have lost is remedial flexibility that
was the hallmark of unfair competition. Courts have largely given up on more
limited injunctive relief—relief short of complete injunction but that might be
sufficient to prevent confusion.
IV. WHAT TO DO?
So this is the part where I am supposed to provide some grand solution to
the problems I have identified. And given the tenor of what I have said so far,
it probably seems like I would argue that we would be better off if we just went
back to the way things were—redefining trademark subject matter in the limited
terms we once used and reinvigorating unfair competition as a distinct doctrine.
And though I might think that result would, in fact, be better (spoiler alert:
I do), I am more realistic than that. We are so far down this road, we are not
going to go back to the way things once were. Still, there are a few things we
can and should do.
First, we should consider limited rollbacks in places it makes sense. One
obvious candidate is trade dress, and particularly product configuration, which

83. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 30:1 (“A permanent injunction is the usual and normal remedy once trademark infringement has been found in a final judgment.”); see also Paleteria La
Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. DE C.V., 188 F. Supp. 3d 22, 117 (D.D.C. 2016)
aff’d, 743 F. App’x 457 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (awarding a permanent injunction after finding likelihood of
confusion at trial); Peter J. Karol, Trademark’s eBay Problem, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 625, 652 (2016) (finding that between 2003 and 2006, prevailing plaintiffs in trademark
infringement cases received a permanent injunction in 95% of cases).
84. See San Miguel Pure Foods Co. v. Ramar Int’l Corp., 625 F. App’x 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[T]o establish irreparable injury, a trademark owner must do more than merely demonstrate that a
trademark has been infringed or that consumers have been confused.”); Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that there is no presumption of irreparable
harm afforded to parties seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases.”); Voice of the Arab World,
Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Did
eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795, 1796–1805 (2017).
85. See San Miguel, 625 F. App’x at 327 (reversing grant of permeant injunction even where
jury found trademark infringement); Haas Automation, Inc. v. Denny, No. 2:12-CV-04779 (CBM)
(PLAx), 2014 WL 2966989, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2014) (denying permeant injunction because
plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm); AFD China Intell. Prop. Law (USA) Off., Inc. v. AFD China
Intell. Prop. Law Off., No. 3:09-cv-1509-BR, 2014 WL 2619644, at *6 (D. Or. June 12, 2014) (same).
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I think is particularly ill-suited to trademark treatment.86 A number of the most
serious and difficult problems in trademark law are a result of trying to accommodate this subject matter, and we would better respect the boundaries with
other areas of intellectual property by returning to a system that denied protection for product features as such, subject to a more limited set of unfair competition remedies where real passing off was at risk. So, for example, when
Skechers sues Easy Spirit claiming that Easy Spirit’s black and white slip-on
shoes look too much like Skechers’s GO WALK tennis shoes, rather than litigating over which features of the GO WALK shoes Skechers owns, we would
instead focus on whether consumers would think that the defendant was selling
its black shoes as Skechers and consider ordering changes—perhaps in name
or packaging or other materials—to make the actual source of the shoes clear.87
Skechers GO WALK

Casual Slip-On Profile
Raised Instep and Heel Upper Portion

Easy Spirit Knock Off

Same
Same

Second, even short of completely reinstating unfair competition rules,
courts could be more aware of what has happened and be less rigid about the
validity/infringement divide. They could understand better the origins of defensive doctrines and be more willing to treat them like true affirmative defenses. They could rediscover equitable discretion (indeed, the statute still tells
them to do so!).88
Finally, and more generally, we need to give some serious thought to the
role of unfair competition going forward. Right now, unfair competition is
largely a zombie doctrine. Plaintiffs invoke unfair competition in the shadow
of their trademark infringement claims—ostensibly as some kind of backup
claim. And they are emboldened in doing so by comments from the Supreme

86. See generally Caitlin Canahai & Mark P. McKenna, The Case Against Product Configuration Trade Dress, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: REFORM OF TRADEMARK LAW (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds.) (forthcoming 2019).
87. See Complaint at 2–3, Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Easy Spirit, LLC, Case 2:19-cv-02141 (C.D.
Cal. March 21, 2019).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2012) (giving courts the power to grant injunctions “according to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable”).
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Court that § 43(a) is not a complete codification of common law unfair competition.89
Usually these unfair competition claims are entirely duplicative of the
trademark claims—thrown in on a sort of belt-and-suspenders approach. But
sometimes the claims seek more than what trademark law allows them.
Take, for example, Belmora v. Bayer.90 In that case, Bayer owned the
FLANAX mark in Mexico, which it used for a naproxen sodium pain reliever.91
Bayer sued Belmora, which had registered and was using the FLANAX mark
for a naproxen sodium pain reliever in the United States.92 Bayer’s theory was
that Belmora violated § 43(a) by using the FLANAX mark in the United States,
even though Bayer admitted it did not own trademark rights in that mark in the
United States.93 Bayer argued that § 43(a) claims do not depend on ownership
of a mark—that § 43(a) provides for claims against conduct that causes confusion even in the absence of mark ownership.94 Claims under § 43(a) focus on
what the defendant does, Bayer argued, not what the plaintiff owns.95
That argument makes a certain amount of textual sense because § 43(a)
makes no reference to ownership of a mark (which is understandable, given that
the provision was never intended to give a cause of action for infringement of
unregistered marks). And Bayer’s argument at least rhymes with old-style unfair competition, which was explicitly available in cases in which the plaintiff
did not own a trademark.
But in reality, what Bayer wanted was the best of both the new and old legal
orders. It wanted the benefits of treating § 43(a) as a version of old unfair competition, so that it could bring a claim when the alleged confusion was caused
by something other than use of Bayer’s trademark (since it did not own the
trademark). At the same time, Bayer did not want the limited remedies offered
by unfair competition. Under the old rules, by admitting it did not own trademark rights, Bayer could not have enjoined Belmora’s use of the FLANAX
mark; the best it could have hoped for were limitations on the manner of Belmora’s use that would make clear it was not Bayer’s FLANAX.
Because the conceptual history of unfair competition and its relationship to
trademark law has mostly been lost in the assimilation, we are left with a
89. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (“§ 43(a) can
never be a federal codification of the overall law of unfair competition” (quoting 4 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:7 (4th ed. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016).
91. Id. at 701.
92. Id. at 702.
93. Id. Bayer sells naproxen sodium in the United States under the ALEVE mark. Id.
94. Id. at 706.
95. Id.
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mashup of ideas and parties that want the best of both worlds. At the very least,
they should not get that.

